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Economics and Environmental 
Markets: Lessons from Water-Quality 
Trading
James Shortle
Water-quality trading is an area of active development in environmental markets. 
Unlike iconic national-scale air-emission trading programs, water-quality trading 
programs address local or regional water quality and are largely the result of 
innovations in water-pollution regulation by state or substate authorities rather 
than by national agencies. This article examines lessons from these innovations 
about the “real world” meaning of trading and its mechanisms, the economic merits 
of alternative institutional designs, utilization of economic research in program 
development, and research needed to improve the success of environmental 
markets for water quality.
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The use of markets to efficiently achieve environmental-quality goals is one 
of the major conceptual innovations for environmental policy coming from 
economic research. Market mechanisms have gained much interest and 
increasing acceptance outside of economics—indeed, the case for markets 
seems to be made at least as much from advocates outside of the discipline as 
from within. Advocates include consulting and trading firms involved in varying 
aspects of the environmental trading business, associations representing such 
businesses, environmental think tanks, legislators, and government agencies 
(e.g., Jones et al. 2005, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) 2004, Talberth et al. 2010, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
2001, 2003, 2004). The benefits of markets touted by their advocates include 
potential efficiency gains and innovation incentives that have been the focus 
of economic research. But the claims of some advocates go further. Markets, it 
seems, can better and more quickly deliver environmental improvements that 
cost less than other policy instruments can. Economic experts are not always 
so enthusiastic because they understand that how markets are designed and 
implemented and the contexts in which they are applied are important factors 
in what they can achieve (Tietenberg 1999).
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To date, markets for environmental quality have figured most prominently in 
fisheries management and air pollution control, and successes in those areas 
have no doubt influenced expectations of what markets can accomplish for 
other resources. In recent years, attention has turned to markets for water. John 
Dales (1968) first proposed using markets to protect water quality in 1968, and 
experimental and demonstration water-quality-trading (WQT) mechanisms 
were established in the United States in the 1980s. Interest in the United 
States increased in the mid-1990s as state water-quality authorities explored 
mechanisms by which to achieve total maximum daily load (TMDL) levels for 
pollutants established by EPA. In 2003, EPA announced policies intended to 
facilitate trading and began providing financial support and technical assistance 
for WQT (EPA 2003, 2004, 2007). Over the last decade, Australia, Canada, and 
New Zealand developed WQT programs and countries surrounding the Baltic 
Sea studied them as a way to address nutrient pollution in the Baltic (Green 
Stream Network 2008, Selman et al. 2009).
In a 2008 survey, Selman et al. (2009) identified 26 programs with 
established WQT rules, 21 programs under consideration or in development, 
and 10 programs that were complete or inactive. The United States led in 
application of WQT, having originated all but 6 of the 57 programs noted in 
the survey. WQT in the United States has taken two general forms (Morgan and 
Wolverton 2005). One is an offset agreement. Traditionally, point sources of 
pollutants had to meet facility-specific emission limits under the Clean Water 
Act (CWA) by reducing their own facilities’ emissions. Under offset agreements, 
they can meet the permit requirements through reductions of pollution at 
other facilities, providing a tool by which to resolve facility-specific permit 
compliance problems. Two prominent, successful examples (Rahr Malting 
Company in 1997 and Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative in 1999) 
used agricultural and other nonpoint-source nutrient-pollution reductions to 
help industrial facilities on the Minnesota River meet the permit requirements. 
The second form of WQT in the United States, and the focus of the remainder 
of this discussion, is intended to facilitate routine trading between multiple 
sources that are contributing to pollution of specific bodies of water. These 
programs typically consist of mechanisms designed to attain a water-quality 
standard expressed as TMDLs or other limits (Morgan and Wolverton 2005, 
EPA 2007).
Several ex post evaluations of North American WQT programs have been 
conducted (e.g., Breetz et al. 2004, 2005, Hoag and Hughes-Popp 1997, Jarvie 
and Solomon 1998, King 2005, Morgan and Wolverton 2005, Newburn and 
Woodward 2012, Ribaudo, Horan, and Smith 1999, Ribaudo and Gottlieb 2011, 
Shabman and Stephenson 2002, Stephenson and Norris 1998), mostly on 
programs implemented prior to 2000. While some successes were reported, 
the studies’ main findings were that there was limited participation by 
potential traders and a lack of trading activity. This suggests that either the 
programs were implemented in contexts in which there was little to gain from 
reallocations of emissions or that the market designs were not conducive to 
realizing potential gains. Program managers who were interviewed about 
the trading mechanisms (Breetz et al. 2004, Morgan and Wolverton 2005) 
attributed the limited trading to a lack of trading partners, lack of adequate 
regulatory drivers (e.g., limits on effluents were not sufficiently stringent 
to create demand for trades), uncertainty about the trading rules, legal and 
regulatory obstacles to trading, high transaction costs, cheaper alternatives, 
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and that the programs were simply too new to permit trades. These obstacles 
suggest that there were flaws in the design of the marketplace in some cases 
and an absence of the underlying economic conditions needed for gains from 
trade in others. Accordingly, one might expect that better market designs could 
improve the amount of trading and the economic outcomes of those markets.
The discussion here approaches the lessons learned from WQT experiments 
from a different perspective. Environmental markets are a major conceptual 
innovation for environmental policy that came from research in environmental 
economics. As the concept moves from pages of books and journals to the 
menu of instruments available to policymakers, however, realized outcomes 
will depend on how the market programs are designed and implemented and 
the contexts in which they occur. I am interested in what can be learned from 
recent WQT experiments about how economists’ ideas about markets are being 
implemented in the water-quality domain, about the economic merits of state 
and local innovations developed so far, about the content and communication 
of our environmental market research, and about our practical policy advice.
WQT is of significant and continuing interest to water-quality policymakers 
despite the lackluster performance of trading programs implemented in the 
1990s. WQT has the potential to improve the economic efficiency of water-
pollution controls. Also, unlike well-known and much-studied national trading 
programs for air-pollution emissions, WQT initiatives have come from state and 
local innovators. In addition, as is the case with many resource conservation 
issues, the physical and economic characteristics of water-quality problems do 
not match up well with the assumptions that are typical textbook models of 
perfectly competitive permit trading. Water markets consequently pose unique 
challenges for market design.
I base this discussion on seven WQT programs that I find particularly 
interesting (See Table 1). The programs were implemented more or less in 
the last decade and thus exclude experimental and demonstration programs 
from prior decades. Each can be viewed as either successful or as unproven 
but promising. Five of the seven address nutrient pollution, a major target of 
WQT programs (Morgan and Wolverton 2005, Selman et al. 2009). Five of the 
Table 1. Water Quality Trading Programs
Program Pollutant Type Sources
Hunter River Salinity Trading  Salinity  Point 
Scheme (Australia)
California Grassland Areas  Selenium Point 
(United States)
Connecticut Nitrogen Credit  Nitrogen Point 
Exchange (United States) 
South Nation River Total Phosphorus  Phosphorus Point, agricultural 
Management Program (Canada)  nonpoint
Greater Miami Watershed Trading Nutrients Point, agricultural  
Pilot Program (United States)  nonpoint
Pennsylvania Nutrient Credit Exchange Nutrients Point, agricultural 
(United States)  nonpoint
Lake Taupo (New Zealand) Nitrogen Agricultural nonpoint
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seven involve agricultural sources, a prominent contributor to water quality. 
One of the appeals of trading in the context of North American water-pollution 
control is that it offers a new and potentially politically palatable approach to 
addressing water pollution from agriculture (Shortle and Horan 2008). Five 
of the programs involve both point and nonpoint sources, an essential form 
of trading if high-priority nutrient-pollution problems are to be addressed 
efficiently. Three are limited to point sources and one is limited to agricultural 
nonpoint sources.
The next three sections provide an overview of the selected programs based 
on the review in Shortle (2011) and are organized according to source: point-
point, point-nonpoint, and nonpoint-nonpoint-nonpoint. Subsequent sections 
address lessons learned about innovators, the meaning and merits of alternative 
trading mechanisms, contributions by economists and others to the design of 
trading programs, and priorities for economic research. All dollar figures are 
U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.
Point-Point Trading Programs
Textbook models of pollution trading generally assume that emissions are 
nonstochastic and observable by source. In a water-quality context, these 
assumptions apply reasonably well only when emissions are traded between 
industrial and municipal point sources.
Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme, Australia
The Hunter River Salinity Trading Scheme in New South Wales, Australia, is an 
important example of successful methods and of the merits of WQT between 
point sources and is considered the most successful WQT program in the world. 
This point-point salinity trading program applies to coal mines and power 
plants. It was initiated as a pilot in 1995 and was made fully operational in 
2002. The New South Wales Office of Environment and Heritage (formerly the 
Department of Environment, Climate Change, and Water (DECCW)) administers 
the program under the guidance of an operations committee that includes 
representatives from the state government, industry, and the community. 
Monitoring points along the river measure whether the amount of water is low 
flow, high flow, or flood flow. When the river is in low flow, no discharges are 
allowed. During high flow, limited discharges are allowed, and they are subject 
to restrictions based on a licensee’s supply of tradable salt credits. An online 
trading platform was developed for exchanging credits with prices and credit 
transactions negotiated by buyers and sellers. Assessments indicate that the 
program has achieved established targets for water quality at a lower cost than 
the prior regulatory scheme would have and allowed expansion of economic 
activity that otherwise might not have occurred (Collins 2005, Kraemer, 
Interwies, and Kampa 2002, New South Wales DECCW 2010).
California Grassland Areas Program, United States
The Grassland Drainage Area consists of irrigated agricultural land in the San 
Joaquin Valley. Drainage systems designed to remove excess irrigation water 
from fields transport naturally occurring selenium in the soil to waterways, 
which causes significant damage to ecosystems. Grassland Area Farmers 
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(GAF), an association of seven irrigation districts, was established in 1996 
to implement measures designed to limit the amount of selenium entering 
the waterway. Among these was a trading program developed with funding 
support from EPA. The total allowable regional selenium load discharged 
into the San Luis Drain was allocated among the member irrigation districts, 
which could meet their load allocations through selenium reductions within 
the district and/or by purchasing selenium offsets from other districts. Trades 
were negotiated by the individual districts directly. The program produced 39 
trades and met the drainage area’s water-quality goals during the two years in 
which it operated. Trading was subsequently suspended because development 
of a drainage-recycling project eliminated the need for trading.
Several features of the program are interesting. Its cap on agricultural 
sources is atypical of North American WQT models that include agriculture. 
The norm is for no restrictions on agricultural sources with agricultural trades 
serving as offsets for point sources. Another significant and related feature 
is the “commodity” traded. Trading programs that involve agricultural land 
generally do not measure agricultural emissions because the nonpoint nature 
of those emissions makes routine accurate measurements infeasible. Instead, 
such markets use calculations of agricultural nonpoint pollution emissions. 
Trading in the GAF was based on actual emissions. This was possible because 
the trading was conducted between irrigation districts rather than between 
farmers and because the irrigation districts collected drainage water in sumps 
before pumping into the San Luis Drain. Useful discussions of this program are 
found in Austin (2001) and Woodward, Kaiser, and Wicks (2002).
Connecticut Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program, United States
The Connecticut Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program (CNCEP) was established 
in 2002 to allocate reduced nitrogen loads among 79 wastewater treatment 
plants that discharged into the Connecticut River. The reductions were required 
by a TMDL limit that was designed to protect Long Island Sound with the limit 
to be achieved in 2014. Wastewater plants are annually assigned individual 
discharge limits to achieve the increasingly stringent cap on nitrogen loads to 
the sound. Facilities generate credits when they reduce nitrogen discharges 
below an assigned limit. If a plant fails to meet its limit, it must acquire credits to 
cover the shortfall. The credit price is set by the Nutrient Credit Advisory Board 
(NCAB), a body appointed by the state legislature. Buyers and sellers do not 
interact in the market. At the close of each year, the state environmental agency 
determines each plant’s actual discharges and credits earned or required to 
be in compliance. The agency also purchases more credits than are needed to 
achieve the aggregate emission cap. Economic incentives are clearly present in 
the CNCEP, but the exchange is not truly a marketplace in which buyers and 
sellers compete. Instead, the exchange essentially involves fixed administrative 
penalties for undercompliance and payments for overcompliance with effluent 
standards.
Annual reports to the state legislature from the NCAB indicate that the 
program is producing credit exchanges and that most of the facilities are 
participating. Typically, there are more credit buyers than sellers. For example, 
in the most recent report on the program’s activity, for 2010, the value of credits 
purchased by the nitrogen credit exchange was $2,263,482 and the value of 
those sold was $3,274,823 (NCAB 2011). Forty-three facilities were required 
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to purchase credits while thirty-five facilities had credits to sell. The imbalance 
between purchases and sales confirms that this program is not a marketplace.
Point-Nonpoint Trading
Trades involving nonpoint sources are challenging because nonpoint pollution 
cannot be metered by source and is inherently stochastic (Shortle and Horan 
2008). Existing programs address this problem by substituting estimates of 
reductions in nonpoint-source pollution for metered reductions.
South Nation River Total Phosphorus Management Program, Canada
The South Nation River Total Phosphorus Management Program was 
established in eastern Ontario, Canada, in 2000 to allow new and expanding 
dischargers of industrial and municipal wastewater to meet stricter 
phosphorus limits by purchasing agricultural offsets at a ratio of 4:1. Since the 
inception of the program, all of the point-source operations have chosen to 
purchase offsets rather than incur the expense of upgrading their treatment 
facilities. South Nation Conservation (SNC), one of 36 conservation authorities 
in Ontario, operates the program. SNC has long been involved in working with 
landowners to implement conservation practices in the watershed. Farmers 
do not participate directly in trading; SNC negotiates the trades. Dischargers 
pay a price per credit that is intended to approximately cover the average cost 
of producing the credit. Payments to SNC are deposited in the Clean Water 
Fund, which is used to finance agricultural projects that generate credits. SNC 
credit sales augment other funding sources that finance implementation of best 
management practices (BMPs) in the watershed.
For 2000 through 2009, 269 phosphorus-reducing projects were established 
through the watershed’s Clean Water Fund, and those measures reduced the 
amount of phosphorus discharged by an estimated 11,843 kilograms (Shortle 
2011). During that period, the program spent $708,403 in Canadian dollars (C$) 
on grants for agricultural and other projects and C$173,225 for program delivery.
Greater Miami Watershed Trading Pilot Program, United States
The Greater Miami Watershed Trading Pilot Program was established in 
2005 (Water Conservation Subdistrict, Miami Conservancy District 2005) as 
an incentive mechanism aimed at accelerating water-quality improvements 
in the Greater Miami Watershed in southwestern Ohio. It provides regulated 
point sources of pollution with the opportunity to purchase nutrient-reduction 
credits from agricultural sources under favorable terms, and tighter restrictions 
are expected in the future once in-stream nutrient criteria are established. 
The Water Conservation Subdistrict of the Miami Conservancy District (MCD) 
manages the program. MCD was established in the early 1900s with a core 
mission of flood control. The Water Conservation Subdistrict serves as a 
clearinghouse; it buys pollution-reduction credits from agricultural sources and 
transfers nutrient-reduction credits to point sources. Five founding investors 
support the program: the cities of Dayton, Englewood, and Union; Butler 
County; and the Tri-Cities Wastewater Authority (representing three cities).
Point sources earn credits for nitrogen and phosphorus reductions by 
implementing agricultural BMPs. The baseline for credit calculation is the 
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level of emission that occurred prior to implementation of BMPs. Activities 
that generate credits must be new, must have been undertaken voluntarily 
(not legally mandated), and cannot be funded by other conservation incentive 
programs. Trade ratios (pounds of nonpoint nitrogen or phosphorus required 
to offset a pound of point-source nitrogen or phosphorus) are designed to 
encourage early participation by point sources. Dischargers that purchase 
credits before new, more stringent restrictions are imposed can, with some 
exceptions, do so at a ratio of 1:1. Once the new restrictions are imposed, the 
ratio increases to 3:1.
The Water Conservation Subdistrict conducts periodic reverse auctions to 
purchase credits. To be eligible to sell credits, an agricultural producer must 
be located within a participating Soil and Water Conservation District (SWCD) 
and work with the district to develop projects and submit bids. SWCDs also 
provide post-award oversight. There are fourteen SWCDs in the Greater Miami 
Watershed that are eligible to participate and nine have been active in the 
program. The subdistrict obtains funds with which to purchase credits and 
operate the program from participating point sources and federal grants that 
support development of innovative trading programs.
As of June 30, 2011, nine rounds of project submittals had been completed 
and 345 agricultural projects had been funded, generating more than one 
million credits over the life of the projects. The credits are to be generated over 
the contractual period for each project (maximum of 20 years; minimum of 1 
year). Slightly more than $1.5 million will be paid to agricultural producers and 
$89,000 has been allocated to the SWCDs for assistance and oversight.
Pennsylvania Nutrient Credit Trading Program, United States
The Pennsylvania Nutrient Credit Trading Program is potentially the most 
important emerging WQT effort due to the significance of the water-quality 
problem it addresses—the flow of nutrients from point and nonpoint sources in 
Pennsylvania to Chesapeake Bay, the largest estuary in the United States—and 
to the number of potential participants and expected regulatory cost savings. 
While only a little more than one-third of the bay’s watershed is located in 
Pennsylvania, the state was the source of 56 percent of the nitrogen and 44 
percent of the phosphorus estimated to have entered the bay in 2009.
Chesapeake Bay has been a focal point for federal and state initiatives to reduce 
nutrient pollution for decades. Beginning in 1983, EPA, the mayor of the District 
of Columbia, and the governors of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia agreed 
to establish the Chesapeake Bay Program, which was to set goals for nutrient 
reductions and develop strategies by which to attain those goals. Insufficient 
progress led EPA to establish TMDLs for the bay’s tributaries in 2010.
Pennsylvania implemented a WQT program in 2005 as one element in a 
set of initiatives designed to meet its obligations under the Chesapeake Bay 
Program agreements and in anticipation of the TMDLs in 2010. Pennsylvania’s 
Department of Environmental Protection administers the program, which 
assists regulated point-source operations in meeting effluent limits via nitrogen 
and phosphorus credits acquired from uncapped agricultural nonpoint sources 
and other point sources. Farmers earn credits by implementing BMPs. Unlike 
the Greater Miami Watershed trading program in Ohio, Pennsylvania’s program 
does not use the level of emissions that otherwise would have occurred as the 
baseline for calculating nutrient reductions. Instead, farmers’ are required to 
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meet a set of baseline farming practice requirements to be eligible to earn and 
sell credits from further reductions. The program multiplies the estimate of 
eligible on-farm nutrient reduction by an “edge of segment ratio,” a “delivery 
ratio,” and 0.9 to determine the marketable credit. The first two ratios 
essentially estimate the reduction in loading of nitrogen and phosphorus to the 
bay while the third is a form of in-kind tax that funds a credit reserve intended 
to provide a buffer against defaults by credit suppliers. The program applies 
analogous rules to point sources that seek to generate credits by reducing 
emissions below the regulatory requirements.
Farmers and credit buyers can participate and compete directly in the market. 
The state funded development of an online tool for calculating and registering 
credits to facilitate their participation. In 2010, the state launched a nutrient 
credit clearinghouse that is managed by the Pennsylvania Infrastructure 
Investment Authority, a state agency (known as PENNVEST) that traditionally 
was charged with financing water infrastructure investments. Credit exchanges 
can be made through bilateral negotiations, but PENNVEST also conducts 
periodic double auctions to buy and sell credits. The program offers greater 
opportunities for dischargers and farmers to benefit from market-based 
trading than other North American WQT programs so far developed. Prior to 
creation of PENNVEST’s clearinghouse, the program completed eight trades 
that all involved sales of agricultural credits. Seven of the trades were organized 
by market intermediaries that are commonly referred to as “aggregators” and 
that work with groups of farmers to provide a sufficient supply of credits to 
meet the needs of large point-source buyers. To date, PENNVEST auctions have 
produced little more.
Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia also recently implemented nutrient 
credit-trading programs. They lag Pennsylvania’s in market development 
and trading activity. Their participation requirements are more rigorous and 
development of market mechanisms has been minimal. Managers with EPA’s 
Chesapeake Bay Program are studying development of a nutrient trading 
program that would allow for trades across state borders in the Chesapeake 
Bay watershed.
Nonpoint-Nonpoint Trading
I previously noted that trading programs that involve agricultural nonpoint 
sources are designed to reduce the cost of point-source compliance using 
agricultural reductions as low-cost offsets. An exception is the Lake Taupo 
agricultural nonpoint-nonpoint trading program recently developed by 
Environment Waikato of New Zealand. Lake Taupo is the largest freshwater 
lake in New Zealand (Duhon, Young, and Kerr 2011). Nitrogen leaching 
from grazing-based farming systems and other sources causes nutrient 
pollution, which led Environment Waikato to seek a 20 percent reduction 
in nitrogen loads. The program is exceptional in that it is designed as a 
true cap-and-trade program with a primary objective of reducing nutrient 
loads from agriculture. This distinguishes it from partial-cap programs that 
dominate WQT applications in North America and that function primarily as 
mechanisms for reducing the cost of industrial and municipal point-source 
compliance.
Landowners receive nitrogen allowances based on their historical land 
uses. In addition, the program developers envision market-like allowance 
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trading among farmers. Farmers seeking to increase nitrogen discharges 
above the levels allowed would be required to acquire allowances from 
others. Environmental authorities for the region established the Lake Taupo 
Protection Trust in 2007 to administer an NZD$81 million public fund for 
activities designed to achieve the 20-percent reduction goal, including 
purchasing a permanent reduction in the nitrogen allowances. The program 
is too new to assess.
Lessons
The Innovators
Leadership in WQT has come from innovators at the state (provincial) level 
or below. In Ohio and Ontario, the initiatives were led by long-established 
conservation agencies. In Connecticut, New South Wales, Pennsylvania, 
and Waikato, leadership came from the states’ environmental agencies. 
In California, innovation came from an association of irrigation districts. 
Several U.S. initiatives received EPA support but remain distinctly local 
products.
These WQT programs emerged as mechanisms to address specific local 
challenges. The point-nonpoint trading programs in Ohio, Ontario, and 
Pennsylvania offer regulated point sources the opportunity to comply with 
tighter or anticipated effluent standards at a lower cost by purchasing credits 
from uncapped agricultural nonpoint sources. The point-point trading 
programs in California, Connecticut, and New South Wales and the Waikato 
program were all similarly motivated by a desire to reduce the cost of 
complying with increasingly tight water-quality standards. Implementation 
of these trading programs generally required devoting significant effort 
to developing acceptance among stakeholders, and the programs’ designs 
and management structures are, to varying degrees, the result of choices 
made to gain acceptance. O’Grady’s (2011) description of development of 
the South Nation River program is especially useful for understanding the 
political economy of innovating WQT programs. Powers (2005) is similarly 
useful for its description of the Connecticut program and the New South 
Wales DECCW (2006) for the Hunter River.
The Meaning of “Trading”
Economists describe emission trading as a market-based method for allocating 
emissions between various sources. Traditional air- and water-pollution 
regulations entail imposing limits on emissions from specific sources (e.g., 
smokestacks, outfalls) and requiring that those limits be met at the source. 
Emission trading introduces flexibility into how emission limits can be met. A 
source may meet the limit on its emissions in part or in whole (depending on 
trading rules) by acquiring offsetting emission reductions from other sources. 
Under the purely market-based trading envisioned by the concept’s originators, 
trades result from voluntary transactions of property rights between polluters 
or through market-oriented intermediaries, and competition in the marketplace 
is desired to achieve efficiency in pollution allocations.
The concept of WQT is being applied not only to mechanisms that correspond 
to this vision but also to ones that present little or no opportunity for 
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buyers and sellers to interact or compete. Current programs offer a range of 
exchange mechanisms; some provide significant opportunities for market-
like participation while others do not. The models for the Hunter River, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Lake Taupo were designed to facilitate exchanges between 
willing individual buyers and sellers and market pricing. The California 
Grassland Farmers model entailed voluntary exchanges with irrigation districts 
representing the farmers. In contrast, the Connecticut and South Nation River 
schemes involve no direct exchanges between entities that supply emission 
reductions (which earn “sellable” credits) and those that demand such 
reductions to offset emissions in excess of regulatory standards. Credit prices 
are determined by agencies that manage the programs. In the South Nation 
River program, revenue from credit sales goes not to credit suppliers but to a 
fund for agricultural projects by South Nation River Conservancy. Thus, WQT 
in North America has come to refer to mechanisms that allow source-specific 
emission limits to be achieved by reductions performed by other sources 
without specifying the mechanism through which trades are executed.
The Merits of Trading
The textbook economic case that trading is a more efficient mechanism for 
pursuing environmental goals than traditional emission regulations assumes 
that trading is market-based. If there are no significant informational or other 
barriers that prevent market participants from discovering and negotiating 
mutually beneficial trades, a market would be expected to maximize potential 
cost-savings from trading, which implies that the cost of pollution control would 
be minimized (Montgomery 1972). However, North American WQT programs 
are being developed not to replace traditional regulations but to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of traditional regulatory systems. This trajectory is 
consistent with the history of emission trading programs generally—they tend 
to be considered and adopted after traditional regulatory approaches have 
failed (Tietenberg 1999).
Looking at the United States, water pollution control since the early 1970s 
has been regulated largely through emission limits applied to industrial and 
municipal point sources of water pollution. Agricultural and other nonpoint 
sources of pollution have been addressed through an array of local, state, and 
federal initiatives that emphasize voluntary adoption of pollution-control 
practices with subsidies as incentives. These initiatives generally have fallen 
short of meeting their established water-quality goals (Ribaudo 2009). 
Additional problems have come from the historical structure of water-pollution 
control programs. For example, the water-quality gains that were realized were 
overly expensive because the regulatory framework did not allow point sources 
to use offsets and because of constraints on technological choices contained 
in pollution permits (Davies and Mazurek 1998, Ribaudo 2009, Shabman and 
Stephenson 2007, EPA 2001). Regulation of point and agricultural nonpoint 
pollution sources in Canada is much the same as in the United States (Weersink 
et al. 1998).
Since established water-quality goals were not met, lawsuits were filed 
that required EPA to implement the TMDL provisions of the CWA in the mid-
1990s. Those provisions required state water-quality authorities to establish 
goals for pollution loads for both point and nonpoint sources in waters that 
did not meet the water-quality targets and to develop programs to achieve the 
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designated goals (Ribaudo 2009). Interest in WQT emerged in this context as a 
means of achieving TMDLs, expanding the reach of water-pollution controls to 
include agricultural nonpoint sources, and improving the economic efficiency 
of water-pollution-control allocations among and between point and nonpoint 
sources (Shortle and Horan 2008). The North American model by which point 
sources trade with agricultural nonpoint sources entails using the agricultural 
nonpoint sources as offsets and thus reducing the cost of compliance for point 
sources. This model is consistent with the “pay the polluter” strategy that has 
dominated agricultural nonpoint-source-pollution control efforts (Shortle et al. 
2012).
Given this background, it is clear that the results of emerging WQT programs 
must be evaluated via comparisons to what would have occurred without the 
innovation. While not corresponding to a simple market-based trading model, 
programs like those for point sources in Connecticut and point and nonpoint 
sources in the South Nation River appear to reduce the cost of controlling 
pollution significantly.
Might they be better if they were truly market-based? Perhaps, but setting 
up and operating markets can be expensive. For example, in the Little Miami 
program, the WSC’s operating costs averaged about $200,000 per year 
through 2011 without including funds allocated to participating SWCDs for 
assistance to farmers and oversight of agricultural projects (Shortle 2011). 
In addition, economic agents will not necessarily participate and trade in 
markets just because the opportunity exists. The Pennsylvania model, despite 
being the most market-oriented of the North American programs, has yet to 
demonstrate value. Water-quality markets can pose unique design challenges 
when the program must serve dual goals of water-quality protection and cost-
minimization. The textbook vision of efficient emission trading assumes that 
such emissions can be standardized into a homogenous commodity that can 
be accurately metered for each regulated emitter and are substantially under 
the control of the polluter and that the spatial location of emissions within the 
market does not affect the environmental outcome. It also assumes that trading 
is done by perfectly competitive agents and that transactions costs are minimal. 
A number of these assumptions will not hold even approximately in many, and 
perhaps in most, water-pollution-control contexts (Olmstead 2010, Horan and 
Shortle 2011, Nguyen et al. 2013, Woodward and Kaiser 2002, Woodward, 
Kaiser, and Wicks 2002).
WQT programs are emerging from agencies that seek to realize the 
benefits of trading while simultaneously addressing a variety of hydrological, 
informational, economic, cultural, and regulatory water-pollution challenges. 
The cases reviewed here show a variety of interesting institutional innovations 
that employ an assortment of economic incentives to varying degrees. The 
much-discussed failures of early WQT experiments result not from coordination 
failures but from little or no participation by eligible agents. Institutions and 
mechanisms that can successfully engage participants (even if they do not 
know they are being recruited, as in the South Nation River project), who will 
then reduce the cost of compliance, are fundamental to success. Involvement of 
agencies well-known to and trusted by farmers in the Little Miami and South 
Nation River regions was crucial to the accomplishments of those programs 
(Breetz et al. 2005, O’Grady 2011). In contrast, Pennsylvania’s strongly market-
oriented program has made no use of comparable farm-oriented institutions. 
The cases reviewed here suggest that people developing trading programs 
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must be as attentive to the requirements for an effective marketplace as to the 
rules that will govern trading to satisfy their water-quality objectives.
We Are Not the Experts at the Table: Adverse Choices Are a Result
The economic literature on WQT design is limited but still addresses a number 
of key issues associated with dual goals of water-quality protection and cost-
minimization. Among them are selection of the commodity or property right 
to be traded in the market, participation requirements, baseline allocations, 
trading rules meant to assure that exchanges do not violate restrictions on 
water quality, and selection of market structures (Horan and Shortle 2011, 
Shortle and Horan 2008). The results from this literature have generated little 
or no mention in real world program development, and program designs are 
often at odds with what the literature would suggest.
One example is selection of a key parameter that is commonly referred to 
as the point-nonpoint trade ratio. To assure compliance with water-quality 
targets, WQT programs typically translate spatial (geographic distribution) 
and source (point and nonpoint) heterogeneities of the pollutant load into 
equivalent water-quality results using trade ratios that specify how many 
units of emission of one type or from a particular location may be exchanged 
for units of another type or location. This is particularly important in 
programs in which point sources trade a metered unit of commodity while 
nonpoint sources trade a predicted (estimated) unit of commodity. Point-
nonpoint trade ratios are typically defined in terms of the reduction in 
nonpoint emission required to offset a unit of point-source emission. When 
trades are based on predicted emissions, the market contains no explicit 
information about the reliability of the pollution reduction that will be 
achieved by nonpoint sources. Consequently, WQT programs that use 
predicted emissions as a commodity usually implement restrictions on trade 
that are intended to address that uncertainty. The point-nonpoint trade 
ratios used in programs developed so far nearly all exceed unity, implying 
that more than one unit of nonpoint reduction is required to offset a unit of 
point-source emission.
A number of economic studies have addressed the design of point-nonpoint 
trade ratios (Horan et al. 2002, Horan, Shortle, and Abler 2002, Horan 2001, 
Horan and Shortle 2005, Malik, Letson, and Crutchfield 1993, Shortle 1990). 
Three insights are essential. First, uniformly applying a single point-nonpoint 
trade ratio to all point-nonpoint trades diminishes the efficiency and ecological 
effectiveness of the mechanism. Second, the ratio for point-nonpoint trades that 
best manages nonpoint risk may be less than 1:1. Finally, the selection of trade 
ratios should be integrated with decisions about other design parameters, such 
as the commodity to be traded, baseline requirements, and the emission cap. 
Design parameters do not have independent effects on a program’s outcomes. 
In actual practice, point-nonpoint trade ratios are nearly always uniform across 
nonpoint sources, usually exceed (often substantially) 1:1, and were specified 
independently without regard to other WQT design parameters (Shortle and 
Horan 2008). In a survey of trading programs, Selman et al. (2009) found no 
instance in which point-nonpoint ratios had been derived from scientific 
information. Instead, the ratios generally were set at a value thought to be 
politically acceptable to stakeholders. Yet methods for estimating these ratios 
have been developed in the scientific literature on trading (Shortle and Horan 
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2008). The use of ad hoc approaches when developing key program parameters 
despite the availability of scientific methods to support appropriate choices 
indicates a need to better engage science when establishing WQT programs.
Another example is baseline participation requirements. Economic theory 
and research suggest that trading programs are more efficient when barriers to 
entry in the form of baseline pollution-reduction requirements are eliminated 
(Ghosh, Ribaudo, and Shortle 2011). Yet such requirements are a feature of 
many programs (Selman et al. 2009).
So who are the experts? Conferences and workshops for WQT practitioners 
are populated by experienced practitioners and representatives of consulting 
firms, nongovernmental organizations that serve or advocate for the trading 
business, and regulators. Technical guidance comes primarily from the same 
population. Studies in economics that specifically address the design of WQT 
have little presence.
Research Needs
While bottom-up innovations should be encouraged and applauded, WQT 
remains largely an experiment that can benefit from additional economic 
research and more effective economic outreach. As noted previously, economic 
research to date has focused on the design of rules to optimize the efficiency 
of markets in achieving water-quality outcomes. This research generally has 
assumed that WQT markets would result in perfectly competitive equilibria 
and that planners have perfect information about polluters’ costs. Both 
assumptions are problematic.
One useful line of research for water-quality markets generally is experimental 
and behavioral research to improve our understanding of factors that determine 
whether and how agents of various types participate in markets to improve the 
“choice architectures” of those markets. The concept of choice architectures 
has been used in behavioral economics to describe the phenomenon that 
the choices that people make are influenced by the way in which the choices 
and their consequences are presented (Sunstein and Thaler 2008). The same 
phenomenon can be expected to occur in environmental markets, suggesting 
that “good” outcomes will require attention to aspects of the presentation of 
choices and their outcomes within these markets. The goal should be to reduce 
the cost of complexity of participation and to provide understanding of the 
market to help traders make informed decisions. Because ecosystem services 
often are a function of management of working lands, lessons garnered about 
how and why farmers (the leading nonpoint polluters) participate will likely be 
instructive for other environmental markets and vice versa. The issue is partly 
one of incentive design, a subject of active research, but noneconomic factors 
also appear to be important. For example, research by Breetz, et al. (2005) 
found that trust and communication barriers have contributed significantly to 
minimal rates of participation by farmers in trading experiments that engaged 
agriculture.
In addition to improved choice architectures, participation would likely 
increase and trading decisions could be improved by reducing the amount of 
uncertainty in the markets (Cao, Wang, and Zhang 2005). Uncertainty has been 
established as a barrier to participation in new markets. The decisions required 
of participants in environmental markets involve large investments, and 
participation is sure to be hindered by uncertainty about trade volume and/or 
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prices. So far, economic research on trading has focused on market design, not 
market prediction. Research aimed at predicting environmental markets has 
often assumed that equilibrium will be achieved by cost-minimizing allocations 
so it has estimated those allocations rather than behavioral outcomes (Nguyen 
et al. 2013). Economic research that models behavioral outcomes using 
agent-based models or other similar procedures could greatly enhance our 
understanding of what to expect from environmental markets (Roth 2002).
Finally, as previously noted, emerging markets that involve nonpoint sources 
of contaminants generally use estimates of steady-state nonpoint emissions 
as the nonpoint commodity. In a recent paper, Horan and Shortle (2011) 
demonstrated that, to design a market that will address nonpoint risk and 
minimize the cost of pollution abatement, the regulatory authority must be able 
to predict the market equilibrium. That essentially implies that the authority 
must have perfect information because the current models directly address only 
one element of nonpoint risk—the mean. Variance and other relevant moments 
are determined indirectly by polluters’ choices about how to minimize the cost 
of achieving the mean emission reduction. This information requirement would 
seem to diminish the appeal of a market. The economic case for trading is that 
regulatory authorities can use markets to achieve efficient allocations without 
knowing individual polluters’ abatement costs. From that perspective, future 
research would identify new models of WQT that could define the nonpoint 
commodity in terms of multiple risk attributes to better predict the effect of 
the market for the commodity on water-quality conditions (over a steady-state 
expectation) (see also Ghosh and Shortle (2012)). Another concern with current 
models is that they treat contemporaneous point-source emission reductions 
and mean nonpoint reductions as substitutes. Increasingly, the literature on 
management of nutrient pollution is focusing on lags in nonpoint pollution, 
which implies that current nonpoint reductions are substitutes for future point 
reductions (Meals, Dressing, and Davenport 2010). The implications of lags 
for market design have not been significantly addressed (Shortle and Ribaudo 
2012).
Concluding Comments
Water-quality goals in the United States and elsewhere have been pursued 
largely through stringent and costly point-source controls rather than less 
costly nonpoint-source controls. Compounding the cost of this misallocation 
is that point-pollution reductions have not been achieved at the lowest cost 
because regulation of that pollution came from highly inefficient, technology-
based, uniform effluent standards. WQT is emerging within this context as 
a mechanism that can reduce the cost of achieving increasingly stringent 
water-quality goals by allowing reallocation of additional reductions in 
loads to cheaper sources. Some of the WQT programs involve trades among 
point sources, others between point and nonpoint sources, and some among 
nonpoint sources.
The interest in WQT is emerging from economic theory and from real-world 
experiments in air emission markets that indicate that market-based trading 
can achieve environmental goals less expensively than traditional regulatory 
approaches. The concept of WQT is being applied not only to mechanisms 
that correspond to this vision but also to mechanisms that present little or no 
opportunity for buyers and sellers to interact or compete. It is interesting that 
Lessons from Water-Quality Trading    71Shortle
the rhetoric of market-based trading is used widely in the WQT domain to make 
a case for mechanisms that do not, in fact, involve markets. More interesting is 
that these mechanisms are, in several cases, successfully reducing the cost of 
pollution control by reallocating emissions from high-cost to low-cost sources. 
The range of models currently in use provides useful lessons for water-quality 
managers seeking to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their water-
pollution control programs and for economists who wish to understand 
environmental policy innovations and provide research that improves the 
design and selection of economic instruments.
While WQT experiments offer interesting lessons for economists, the 
enterprises themselves can benefit significantly from additional economic 
research and more effective economic outreach. I have suggested two lines of 
research that I believe would be particularly beneficial. One is experimental 
and behavioral studies to improve our understanding of factors that influence 
whether and how agents of various types participate in markets with the 
objective of improving the “choice architectures” of these markets. Another 
is research aimed at reducing uncertainty in predictions about the outcomes 
of markets. More accurate economic predictions would improve individual 
decision-making related to whether and how to participate in markets. Better 
predictions would also improve market design by providing policymakers with 
a realistic understanding of the potential cost savings and of how the design 
of the market influences the economic and ecological performance of trading. 
Useful predictions would abandon the conventional paradigm of modeling the 
trading equilibrium as the least costly pollution-control allocation. Instead, the 
model would directly address challenges specific to water-quality markets. 
Those challenges come from many factors: constraints imposed by the CWA, 
multiple interacting policies, imperfect and asymmetric information about 
costs, heterogeneous agents, stochastic processes in pollution generation and 
movement through watersheds, the inability to meter most emissions from 
nonpoint sources, and spatially heterogeneous and dynamic relationships 
associated with human activities that generate emissions and affect the impact 
of those emissions on water quality.
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